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Note 
How New Zealand’s Adoption of the Nagoya 
Protocol Would Enhance Protection of Māori 
Traditional Knowledge 
Emily Ortlieb Ricciardi 
“Te manu e kei i te miro, nōna te ngahere, Te manu e kai 
i te mātauranga, nōna te ao.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mānuka, or tea tree, is known to have antibacterial, 
antifungal, and antihistamine properties, and is used to treat a 
variety of ailments.2 It is also one of New Zealand’s most 
common native trees, and its medicinal properties were first 
discovered and applied by Māori, the indigenous people of New 
Zealand.3 Over the last several decades, mānuka has been the 
subject of extensive research, providing the basis for a multi-
million dollar commercial industry.4 New Zealand and the 
United States have both granted multiple patents for mānuka-
related products and processes, all of which have one thing in 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. I am 
especially thankful to Amanda Lyons for invaluable guidance throughout the 
drafting of this note. I also extend my gratitude to the editors and staff members 
of the Minnesota Journal of International Law, without whom this publication 
would not be possible. Finally, I am so very grateful to my husband, CJ, and 
greyhound, Charlyhoops, for their continuing support and love. 
       1. Māori proverb meaning “[t]he bird that partakes of the miro berry, owns 
the forest; the bird that partakes of education, owns the world.” MINISTRY 
EDUC., EARLY CHILDHOOD CURRICULUM 13 (2017), https://tewhariki.tki.org.nz/
assets/Uploads/Te-Whariki-Whakatauki.pdf. 
 2. WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, 1 KO AOTEAROA TENEI: A REPORT INTO CLAIMS 
CONCERNING NEW ZEALAND LAW AND POLITY AFFECTING MĀORI CULTURE AND 
IDENTITY 129 (2011) [hereinafter WAI 262 REPORT], 
https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/WT/wt_DOC_68356416/KoAote
aroaTeneiTT2Vol1W.pdf. 
 3. Id. at 130. 
 4. Id. 
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common: utter exclusion of even a mention of the foundational 
Māori traditional knowledge.5 
Māori, like many indigenous and tribal peoples throughout 
the world, have developed a vast wealth of traditional 
knowledge, which they rightfully wish to protect and promote.6 
Few indigenous peoples use the intellectual property legal 
system to do so, as it does not provide adequate solutions to 
challenges typically faced by indigenous peoples regarding 
traditional knowledge.7 However, certain legal mechanisms 
exist—both within New Zealand and internationally—capable of 
bridging the divide between the western intellectual property 
system and Māori understanding of ownership.  
The Waitangi Tribunal, a permanent commission of review 
established by the Crown of New Zealand, oversees claims 
brought by Māori relating to Crown actions of breach of the 
centuries-old Treaty of Waitangi.8 The Nagoya Protocol, 
supplemental to the Convention on Biological Diversity, and not 
yet ratified by New Zealand, provides a transparent legal 
framework for fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out 
of genetic resources.9 By ratifying and implementing the Nagoya 
Protocol, New Zealand could provide an optimal system of 
traditional knowledge protection sensitive to indigenous ways of 
thinking by utilizing Waitangi Tribunal Recommendations and 
the Nagoya Protocol in tandem. 
Part I of this note introduces Māori and existing legal 
mechanisms governing indigenous traditional knowledge. Part 
II proposes the ratification of the Nagoya Protocol as a 
complementary mechanism to the recommendations made by 
the Waitangi Tribunal in the Ko Aotearoa Tenei (Wai 262 
Report). It will analyze the issues arising in the application of a 
Western intellectual property regime to indigenous traditional 
knowledge, the methods by which New Zealand and Māori are 
working together to incorporate traditional knowledge into state 
 
 5. See id. at 130–31. 
 6. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PROTECT AND PROMOTE YOUR 
CULTURE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 3 (2017). 
 7. Id. 
 8. WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/ (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
 9. See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (Oct. 29, 2010). 
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intellectual property protection mechanisms, and benefit 
sharing under the Nagoya Protocol as an alternative way to 
respect indigenous traditional knowledge rights. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. MĀORI PEOPLE OF NEW ZEALAND 
Māori, indigenous to New Zealand, are said to have arrived 
in Aotearoa, or the “land of the long white cloud,” in the 
fourteenth century.10 Each tribe, or iwi, acknowledges a common 
ancestry as well as a particular social order.11 Much of Māori 
culture originated in East Polynesian traditions, which 
developed further during several centuries of isolation to include 
vibrant horticultural innovations and later a warrior culture.12 
Māori are unique in that they recognize “cognatic or bilateral 
descent groups” known as guardians that control or own certain 
resources, including land.13  
Māori currently make up approximately 15% of the New 
Zealand Population.14 The socioeconomic gap between Māori and 
non-Māori is significant; the difference in life expectancy is 
about eight years, household income of Māori is 78% of the 
national average, and Māori make up over 50% of the prison 
population.15 Since the arrival of British colonists in New 
 
 10. Māori nations have and continue to refer to New Zealand as Aotearoa, 
or “land of the long white cloud.” Aotearoa, MAORI.COM, 
https://www.maori.com/aotearoa (last visited Dec. 6, 2018); see also Māori, 
Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/maori (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2018). 
 11. Māori, supra note 10. 
 12. Id.; Maori, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY https://intercontinentalcry.org/
indigenous-peoples/maori/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018); see also AIG, Haka—
History, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AnlFoca
A64M. 
 13. Victor T. King, Cognatic Society, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 106, 107 (Alan Barnard & Jonathan Spencer eds., 
1996). 
 14. See 2013 Census Ethnic Group Profiles: Māori , STATS NZ, http://
archive.stats.govt.nz/census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/ethnic-
profiles.aspx?request_value=24705&parent_id=24704&tabname=#24705 (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2018) (“Māori comprised 598,602 people or 14.9 percent of people 
that stated an ethnic group living in New Zealand on 5 March 2013.”). 
 15. INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, THE INDIGENOUS WORLD 
2017, 283 (Katrine Broch Hansen et al. eds., Apr. 2017), 
https://www.iwgia.org/images/documents/indigenous-world/indigenous-world-
2017.pdf. 
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Zealand in the mid-1700s, Māori have been plagued by a long 
history of inequality and discrimination. 
1. Overview of Māori Key Cultural Language 
iwi: individual tribe within Māori 
kaitiaki: a guardian entrusted to nurture and care for a 
person or aspect(s) of the environment, such as the sky, sea, or 
land.16 
mātauranga Māori: Māori traditional knowledge, the way 
in which Māori view themselves and the world.17 
taonga: anything that is treasured, tangible or intangible, 
including land, waters, wildlife, identity, and culture.18 
2. The Treaty of Waitangi and Waitangi Tribunal 
The Treaty of Waitangi, often referred to as the nation’s 
founding agreement, is an agreement made between Māori and 
the British Crown in 1840.19 Though available in both English 
and Māori at the time of signing, the Treaty contained 
overwhelmingly technical English terms, which lacked Māori 
translation.20 It is not uncommon for an indigenous community 
to have less developed conceptual capabilities within its 
language, as was the case with the Treaty of Waitangi.21 This 
meant that the two parties stood on unequal ground, as Māori 
were additionally unaware of the full meaning of treaty 
agreement practices within British law and culture.22 
The Treaty provided that the British were granted a right of 
governance, with Māori retaining sovereignty of their lands and 
 
 16. Barbara Sullivan & Lynell Tuffery-Huria, New Zealand: Wai 262 
Report and After, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 403, 404 (2014). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The Treaty in Brief, N.Z. HIST., https://nzhistory.govt.nz/
politics/treaty/the-treaty-in-brief (last updated May 17, 2017). The treaty was 
signed by representatives of the British Crown and over 500 Māori chiefs. See 
Sue Scheeles, Safeguarding Indigenous Knowledge and Access to Plant 
Resources Through Partnership: A New Zealand Perspective, 4 INT’L J. RURAL 
L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2015). 
 20. Tim Stirrup, Bioprospecting, the Nagoya Protocol and Indigenous 
Rights; A New Zealand Perspective, 107 J. INTELL. & INDUS. PROP. SOC’Y AUSTL. 
& N.Z. 53, 58 (2016). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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resources.23 Māori were also granted the same rights as British 
citizens; although subsequent New Zealand governments 
ignored the Treaty for many years following the signing.24 Today 
the treaty has limited legal status and therefore “Māori rights 
are largely dependent on political will and ad hoc recognition of 
the treaty.”25 
Constant dispute over the operation and text of the Treaty 
of Waitangi led to the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal, which 
was established by the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975.26 The 
Tribunal’s main purpose is to determine the meaning of the 
Treaty, which involves investigation of Māori claims of breach of 
the Treaty.27 However, the Tribunal has no authoritative power 
other than to issue recommendations for remedy.28 Regardless, 
it has been hailed a “mammoth and ongoing public history-
making project.”29 Since 1975, the Tribunal has issued upwards 
of ninety reports in response to hundreds of both historical and 
contemporary claims filed before it.30 
The Waitangi Tribunal retains up to twenty members, each 
appointed by the Governor-General following recommendation 
by the Minister for Māori Development.31 Typically, half are 
Māori and half are Pākehā, New Zealanders of European 
descent.32 Membership is diverse, and members are appointed 
based on expertise in a given area that is likely to come before 
the Tribunal.33 Panels of up to seven members are appointed to 
carry out inquiries of the claims made before it; each panel must 
include at least one Māori member.34 
In 2014, the Tribunal announced a “Strategic Direction” 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Susan Corbett, Governance Systems for Access to and Use of Indigenous 
Knowledge and Culture: A New Zealand Perspective (Mar. 7, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015026. 
 25. Stirrup, supra note 20, at 58. 
 26. Id. at 61. 
 27. Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, pmbl. (N.Z.). 
 28. Id. art. 3; Stirrup, supra note 20, at 61. 
 29. Rachel Buchanan, Decolonizing the Archives: The Work of New 
Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal, 14 PUB. HIST. REV. 44, 45 (2007). 
 30. Id. 
 31. About the Waitangi Tribunal, WAITANGI TRIB., https://www.waitangi
tribunal.govt.nz/about-waitangi-tribunal/members-of-the-waitangi-tribunal/ 
(last updated Nov. 1, 2018). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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plan to be implemented between 2014 and 2025.35 The plan 
acknowledges that unresolved past Treaty grievances present a 
major obstacle to restoring and sustaining the relationship 
between Māori and the Crown as defined by the Treaty.36 These 
historical claims relate to issues faced by indigenous peoples 
globally: colonization, loss of land, and economic and social 
marginalization.37 Historical claims are separate from 
contemporary claims which cover the last twenty years, and 
thematic claims, which are general grievances that affect Māori 
statewide.38 The Tribunal aspires to address all historical claims 
by 2020, followed by completion of thematic ones.39 The overall 
goal is to reduce the backlog completely by 2025, giving the 
Tribunal the ability to hear claims as they are filed. 
3. Wai 262 and Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims 
Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Māori 
Culture and Identity 
Wai 262 is a collection of claims filed in 1991 by individuals 
from six separate Māori nations who were alarmed by the 
exploitation of their traditional knowledge and the 
misappropriation of “[i]ndigenous flora and fauna.”40 The claim 
was amended in 1997 in light of proposed intellectual property 
and free trade legislation.41 The claimants also sought a specific 
definition of the term taonga, traditionally and broadly 
understood to mean “treasure,” to include all parts of a tribe’s 
collective estate, “material and non-material, tangible and 
intangible.” Probably the most sweeping claim brought before 
the Tribunal, Wai 262, is, at its core, a claim about mātauranga 
Māori: “the unique Māori way of viewing the world, 
incorporating both Māori culture and Māori traditional 
 
 35. WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, WAITANGI TRIBUNAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION 
2014–2025 (2014), https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/Documents/
Publications/WT-Strategic-direction-2014-to-2025.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 2. 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Fleur Adcock, Diluted Control: A Critical Analysis of the Wai 262 Report 
on Māori Traditional Knowledge and Culture, in INDIGENOUS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 497–516 (Matthew 
Rimmer ed., 2015). 
 41. Id. 
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knowledge.”42 Like many legal issues, the actual claim is 
confounded by disputed meaning of certain words.43 In this case, 
it is further complicated by translations in Māori and English.44 
Most of the Wai 262 centers on the meaning of taonga in 
Article 2 of the Treaty. Both the Tribunal and New Zealand 
courts have determined taonga to include treasures of both 
tangible and intangible nature.45 However, the Wai 262 
claimants insist that it includes other elements central to their 
culture and identity, including traditional cultural expressions 
as well as indigenous flora and fauna.46 The Tribunal ultimately 
found that New Zealand intellectual property law did not 
provide adequate protection to Māori taonga, as understood by 
Māori people.47 It then made a series of recommendations for 
intellectual property reform capable of functioning within 
existing intellectual property law.48 
The findings were released in a report in 2011, which 
considers a wide variety of Māori interests including intellectual 
and cultural property, protection of language, traditional Māori 
healing, and the impact on Māori people of international 
commitments made by the Crown.49 At more than one thousand 
pages and twenty years of hard work, the Report is significant 
both for New Zealand’s and the international intellectual 
property systems.50 The claim centers on a New Zealand treaty 
and its attempt to determine “what indigenous peoples’ control 
over their traditional knowledge should look like in 
contemporary times . . . .”51 The Report has received mixed 
reviews; some see it as giving too much control to Māori, and 
some as failing to offer Māori any meaningful control. Still some 
see it as striking an adequate balance between the two.52 
The Tribunal noted in the Report the tension between 
tradition in Western practice to attribute value by property 
rights and Māori practice to attribute value in terms of kinship 
 
 42. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
 43. Adcock, supra note 40, at 500. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 506. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 497. 
 50. Id. at 498. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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and obligations to the collective.53 The Tribunal observes that 
the principles of kaitiakitanga (guardianship) and property 
rights are simply two different ways to conceptualize the same 
issue: “the ways in which two cultures decide the rights and 
obligations of communities in their created works and valued 
resources.”54 
At the heart of the Wai 262 claim is mātauranga Māori, or 
Māori knowledge, which is connected to the term taonga.55 The 
Waitangi Tribunal provides a working definition of a taonga 
work as “a work, whether or not it has been fixed, that is in its 
entirety an expression of mātauranga Māori; it will relate to or 
invoke ancestral connections, and contain or reflect traditional 
narratives or stories.”56 Taonga works can be ancient or modern, 
and function as representations of ancestors.57 As such, Māori 
kaitiaki, or guardians, are entrusted with the responsibility to 
protect the physical wellbeing of taonga, including taonga 
species, or flora and fauna both native and nonnative to New 
Zealand that carry stories related to Māori ancestors.58 
In terms of intellectual property, Wai 262 is rooted in a 
twofold objection: first, in the inappropriate exploitation of 
Māori traditional knowledge by non-Māori, and second, in the 
inability of Māori to control their traditional knowledge 
themselves.59 Another major claim voiced within Wai 262 is the 
failure of New Zealand’s intellectual property laws to protect the 
mātauranga Māori (Māori traditional knowledge) as a taonga, 
or cultural treasure, which is guaranteed under Article 2 of the 
Treaty of Waitangi.60 The six iwi who brought the claim declared 
that New Zealand’s intellectual property laws neither actively 
prevent third parties from exploiting mātauranga Māori, nor 
permit Māori to reap the benefits of their traditional knowledge 
should they choose to do so.61 Against the backdrop of the 
 
 53. Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 404. 
 54. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. 
 55. Id. at 96. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Adcock, supra note 40, at 502. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Seamus Woods, Patents, PVRs and Pragmatism: Giving Effect to the 
WAI 262, 19 CANTERBURY L. REV. 97, 97 (2013). 
 60. See Essence of the Wai 262 Claim, WAI 262, https://wai262.weebly.com/
essence-of-the-claim.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2018); cf. Oliver Sutherland et al., 
The Background to WAI 262, 8, WAI 262, https://wai262.weebly.com/
uploads/7/4/6/3/7463762/history_wai_262.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
 61. Woods, supra note 59, at 99. 
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irreconcilable guardianship spirit and Western intellectual 
property regime, the Waitangi Tribunal released its 
recommendations in the Report titled Ko Aotearoa Tēnei (“[t]his 
is New Zealand”) in July 2011.62 
B. BIOCOLONIALISM AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism defines 
biocolonialsim as an extension of the “reach of the colonial 
process into the biomes and knowledge systems of indigenous 
peoples in the search for marketable genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.”63 Some have considered cultural and 
intellectual property rights to be a second wave of colonization, 
as the principles of Western intellectual property are seen as an 
extension of foreign conquest and dominance.64 Indigenous 
scholars have associated the biocolonial process with “control, 
manipulation and ownership of life itself, and the ancient 
knowledge systems held by indigenous peoples.”65 Indigenous 
peoples then, as the original innovators, owners, and stewards 
of much of the world’s biodiversity, find themselves at the center 
of this problem.66 Rather than consolidating the concept of 
ownership, some indigenous peoples view their heritage and 
culture as a whole in terms of community and individual 
responsibility.67 Specific to Māori traditions, knowledge is 
shared and passed down to successive generations according to 
Māori customary law.68 Generally speaking, even individual 
roles to care for a particular person or natural resource are 
undertaken on behalf of the community as a whole, emphasizing 
the idea of collective ownership.69 
Another scholar has said that “[i]f colonialism encompasses 
the interlocking array of policies and practices (economic, social, 
 
 62. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at xxiii (defining “Ko Aotearoa Tēnei”); 
Woods, supra note 59, at 101 (“The Government, which is not bound by the 
Tribunal’s proposals, reacted by giving assurances that it will consider the 
recommendations over time, but that it was in ‘no rush’ to respond . . . .”). 
 63. Debra Harry, Biocolonialism and Indigenous Knowledge in United 
Nations Discourse, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 702, 702 (2011). 
 64. JESSICA CHRISTINE LAI, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 60 (2014). 
 65. Harry, supra note 63, at 703. 
 66. Id. at 704. 
 67. LAI, supra note 64, at 60. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 61. 
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political, and legal) that a dominant culture draws on to 
maintain and extend its control over other peoples and lands, 
biocolonialsim emphasizes the role of science policy and of 
scientific practice within that array.”70 Extractive biocolonialism 
is the process by which biological “resources and information 
about them are sought, ‘discovered,’ and ‘removed to the 
microworlds of biotechnoscience.’”71 These resources and 
information are “legally christened” as the intellectual property 
of an individual, corporation, or institution, and then further 
exploited by placement in a state or global market as a 
commodity.72 
The highly controversial issue of whether traditional 
knowledge should or can be governed by a Western intellectual 
property regime is the same issue presented before the Tribunal 
in the Wai 262 claim.73 Perhaps the largest Māori concern is that 
reducing this aspect of their culture to Māori “traditional 
knowledge” or Māori “intellectual property” overgeneralizes and 
misrepresents the multifaceted spiritual connection between the 
traditional knowledge and their culture and way of life as a 
whole.74 This is not a struggle that is unique to Māori people; 
many peoples, particularly across the global south, are equally 
fraught.75 The Western world generally highlights both 
commodification and individual ownership. Intellectual property 
rights are seen as a means of incentivizing innovation by 
allowing an inventor or breeder to temporarily benefit from her 
invention.76 Conversely, indigenous peoples including Māori see 
themselves in a guardianship role over tangible and intangible 
resources alike.77 Thus, emphasis is placed on an unending 
spiritual oneness with nature.78 Relatedly, the Waitangi 
Tribunal in its 2011 report on the Wai 262 claim found that 
“while Māori have no proprietary rights in taonga species, the 
cultural relationships between kaitiaki and taonga species are 
 
 70. Laurie Anne Whitt, Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property & the New 
Imperial Science, 23 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 211, 212 (1998). 
 71. Id. at 213. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Woods, supra note 59, at 97. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., WIPO ACADEMY, CASE STUDY: HOODIA PLANT (Jan. 2008), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/academy/en/about/global_network/educa
tional_materials/cs1_hoodia.pdf. 
 76. Woods, supra note 59, at 100. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 101. 
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entitled to reasonable protection.”79 
It is not difficult to see why Māori’s guardianship 
relationship with the mātauranga Māori is inadequately served 
by a restrictive Western intellectual property system.80 The idea 
of owning or exploiting the mātauranga, regardless of who is 
doing the owning or exploiting, is a foreign and exceptional 
concept.81 Further, neither intellectual property law nor 
equivalent terms exist within Māori culture or language.82 UN 
experts have held the position that the Western intellectual 
property system is “inherently unsuitable” for the protection of 
indigenous intellectual property, in that “[s]ubjecting indigenous 
peoples to such a legal scheme would have the same effect on 
their identities, as the individualization of land ownership, in 
many countries, has had on their territories—that is, 
fragmentation into pieces, and the sale of the pieces, until 
nothing remains.”83 
One scholar points out that it is impossible to compare 
intellectual property and real property in this way under a 
western property regime.84 In indigenous knowledge systems, 
outsider use of indigenous cultural heritage can alter the 
integrity of that particular aspect of the indigenous cultural 
heritage, rendering it useless to that community.85 
C. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND THE 
NAGOYA PROTOCOL 
In the Wai 262 Report, the Waitangi Tribunal refers to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) as the “centre of 
gravity” in the debate on international bioprospecting.86 The 
 
 79. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 212. 
 80. See id. at 51, 209. 
 81. See id. at 208–11. 
 82. LAI, supra note 64, at 59. 
 83. Id. (quoting Daes, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of 
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, ¶ 32 (1993)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 146; see Bioprospecting, UNDP, 
http://www.undp.org/content/sdfinance/en/home/solutions/bioprospecting.html 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2018) (describing bioprospecting as a process by which 
biological material in nature is sought after for the purpose of developing 
commercially-valuable products in areas such as pharmaceuticals and 
agriculture). 
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CBD provides an international framework for preserving 
biodiversity. In 2010 an optional protocol to the CBD was 
adopted: The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (“Nagoya 
Protocol”).87 The Nagoya Protocol is the product of eleven years 
of steadfast effort on the part of multiple groups of people: 
experts on access and benefit-sharing agreements, a range of 
state representatives, UN diplomats, as well as multiple 
indigenous rights groups.88 It functions as a supplementary 
agreement to the Convention on Biodiversity (“CBD”), aiming to 
facilitate “access to genetic resources from each sovereign state” 
and to safeguard the sharing of benefits that result from 
research, development and commercialization of said 
resources.89 It came into force in October 2014, and has since 
been ratified by seventy-four countries.90 New Zealand decided 
to defer ratification until the Wai 262 claim has been officially 
settled, as well as the clarification of certain ambiguities within 
the Nagoya Protocol.91 Some are of the opinion that New Zealand 
is also reluctant due to the paramount importance of the Treaty 
of Waitangi.92 The Wai 262 Report actually contains a thorough 
history of the Nagoya Protocol, but is purely informational and 
does not involve a recommendation.93 
The Nagoya Protocol provides a legal structure to regulate 
the use of both genetic resources and traditional knowledge by 
“users,” meaning third-party states, companies, or other 
institutions.94 It additionally outlines accepted practices 
concerning bioprospecting, in order to better reduce the potential 
negative consequences to the states and indigenous communities 
from which the resource originates, or the “provider.”95 The 
Nagoya Protocol also addresses traditional knowledge, as it 
 
 87. See WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 150; About the Nagoya Protocol, 
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/ (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
 88. Stirrup, supra note 20, at 56. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 60. New Zealand would like to see further clarity on the 
application of the Protocol to various sectors, namely agriculture. 
 92. Scheeles, supra note 19, at 1. 
 93. See WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 150–52. 
 94. Id. at 148–51. 
 95. Id. 
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relates to genetic resources.96 Concrete obligations of states who 
are party to the Nagoya Protocol include establishing clear rules 
and procedures for prior informed consent, and providing for the 
issuance of a permit or equivalent if and when access is 
granted.97 States must also establish certain mechanisms and 
provide financial support in order to achieve the overall objective 
to ensure “fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the 
utilization of genetic resources . . . thereby contributing to the 
conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its 
component.”98 
The CBD as a whole gives sovereign rights to states over 
genetic resources found within their borders.99 On its face, this 
was (and is) problematic for indigenous peoples, given that said 
peoples are often not recognized by states as sovereign (and in 
many cases, hardly recognized at all).100 Further, many 
indigenous communities worldwide reject the sovereignty of the 
government over their genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge.101 The Nagoya Protocol remedies the sovereignty 
issue, at least in theory, by recognizing that indigenous 
communities may have claims to a certain genetic resource 
associated with traditional knowledge.102 It also encourages the 
Provider states to recognize customary laws and work with 
provider communities to obtain prior informed consent “on 
 
 96. Id. Though this is a step in the right direction, the majority of the body 
of traditional knowledge involving cultural heritage and other traditional 
cultural expressions is left out. 
 97. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 87. 
 98. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1. 
 99. Id. pmbl. 
 100. See RISHABH KUMAR DHIR, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE WORLD OF 
WORK IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: A STATUS REPORT 3 (2015), 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/
publication/wcms_438853.pdf (explaining harsh conditions indigenous people 
face today); Environment, UNDESA, https://www.un.org/development/desa/
indigenouspeoples/mandated-areas1/environment.html (last visited Dec. 28, 
2018). 
 101. Jeremy Hance, Indigenous Peoples Fight for Their Rights. Governments 
and Businesses Call Them Terrorists, HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2018, 5:45 am), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/indigenous-people-terrorists-criminals-
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Back with #NativeLivesMatter Movement, N.Y. PUB. RADIO: TAKEAWAY (Oct. 
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Peter Veit, 5 Ways Indigenous Groups Are Fighting Back Against Land 
Seizures, WORLD RES. INST.: BLOG (June 20, 2018), https://www.wri.org/blog/
2018/06/5-ways-indigenous-groups-are-fighting-back-against-land-seizures. 
 102. Id. 
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mutually agreed terms for the use of the genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.103 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THE WESTERN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
At the forefront of issues relating to indigenous traditional 
knowledge is the divide between Western scientific 
methodologies and intellectual property regime, and indigenous 
methodologies and perceptions of traditional knowledge 
sharing.104 The divide is further exacerbated by lack of 
recognition and lack of available protection for the intellectual 
knowledge and achievements of indigenous communities.105 
Multiple indigenous scholars continue to be hindered by western 
scientists and government officials who devalue or disregard 
traditional knowledge as lacking in contribution to western 
science.106 Indigenous writers have regarded Western 
bioprospecting practices as biocolonialism.107 They argue that 
the Western world is both “rooted in capitalism and practices of 
maldevelopment” and “looking for new colonies to invade and 
exploit for further accumulation of wealth.”108 
Although interest in acknowledging traditional knowledge 
in certain areas of the world has grown, it has resulted in 
recognition attempts that do not align with the needs. One 
example is the recent endeavors to document and preserve 
indigenous knowledge in databases. On its face, this seems both 
beneficial and worthwhile to indigenous and non-indigenous 
 
 103. Id.; see also Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6, 7. 
 104. Corbett, supra note 25, at 3. 
 105. Jessica Hutchings, Is Biotechnology an Appropriate Development Path 
for Māori?, in PACIFIC GENES & LIFE PATENTS: PACIFIC INDIGENOUS 
EXPERIENCES & ANALYSIS OF THE COMMODIFICATION & OWNERSHIP OF LIFE 23, 
28 (Aroha Te Pareake Mead & Steven Ratuva eds., 2007). 
 106. See generally MARGARET KOVACH, INDIGENOUS METHODOLOGIES: 
CHARACTERISTICS, CONVERSATIONS, AND CONTEXTS (2009); LINDA TUHIWAI 
SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
(2d ed. 2012); Corbett, supra note 25. 
 107. Giovanna Di Chiro, Indigenous Peoples and Biocolonialism: Defining 
the “Science of Environmental Justice” in the Century of the Gene, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CHALLENGE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 251, 252 (Ronald Sandler & 
Phaedra C. Pezzullo eds., 2007). 
 108. Hutchings, supra note 105, at 28. 
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parties; however, it can also be seen as an effort to separate 
indigenous knowledge from the peoples themselves.109 
The characteristic power and economic imbalances between 
states and indigenous peoples, even in states like New Zealand 
that formally recognize the indigenous peoples within their 
borders, further aggravates this issue.110 Economic imbalances 
in particular can come into play when negotiating a benefit-
sharing mechanism as outlined in the Nagoya Protocol.111 For 
example, indigenous communities are at a disadvantage in 
comparison to an international corporation seeking to patent a 
pharmaceutical drug rooted in traditional knowledge. The 
corporation is capable of employing a high-level legal team 
concerned exclusively with the interests of the corporation.112 
Imbalances aside, indigenous peoples like Māori typically come 
to the table lacking understanding of western intellectual 
property frameworks. In one account of Māori perspective, the 
idea of benefits derived exclusively from commercial exploitation 
by way of commodification and ownership is profoundly “at odds 
with a guardianship ethos; indeed, in many instances affording 
such treatment to Māori [traditional knowledge] will be deeply 
 
 109. Corbett, supra note 25, at 3. See generally Marie Battiste, Research 
Ethics for Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage: Institutional and 
Researcher Responsibilities, in ETHICAL FUTURES IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: 
DECOLONIZING THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE 111, 114 (Norman K. Denzin & 
Michael D. Giardina eds., 2007); Arun Agrawal, Indigenous Knowledge and the 
Politics of Classification, 54 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 287, 288–93 (2002). 
 110. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, ¶¶ 63–64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (July 1, 2013). 
 111. See generally Dhir, supra note 100, at 3–4 (explaining that indigenous 
peoples are worse than the population in general and face new threats from 
globalization with the intensification of pressures on resources). 
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WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 128 (explaining how the indigenous peoples 
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of mātauranga Māori, even with their guaranteed right under article 2 of the 
Treaty); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPs and Traditional Knowledge: Local 
Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks 
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.155, 170–76 (2006) (showing how many 
companies have patented products that are extracted from indigenous plants 
without giving proper compensation to indigenous peoples); Marcia Ellen 
DeGeer, Biopiracy: The Appropriation of Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural 
Knowledge, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 179, 179–82 (2003) (explaining how 
biotechnological corporations have been taking from indigenous peoples and 
exercising biopiracy). See generally Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 110. 
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offensive to Māori culture.”113 Additionally, intellectual property 
laws at both the international and domestic level do not 
recognize the traditional collective ownership and typically 
require some sort of novelty or originality in order for knowledge 
to merit protection.114 
However, the Nagoya Protocol is extraordinary in that it 
focuses on the fundamentals of prior and informed consent and 
fair and equitable benefit sharing.115 Though perhaps 
paradoxical, some indigenous communities who balk at the idea 
of commercial exploitation via ownership have hailed the 
Nagoya Protocol as an important step in the right direction, as 
it addresses gaps in non-indigenous legal systems that 
categorically deny indigenous peoples adequate legal recourse 
and compensation for unapproved use of traditional knowledge 
by third parties.116 This may be better viewed as a survival 
mechanism; in order to remain afloat in a Western-dominated 
world and avoid exploitation, it is beneficial to learn the system 
and use it for the community’s benefit. The Nagoya Protocol thus 
provides an important shift in international mechanisms, 
whether intended or not, to begin to recognize minority systems 
and ideologies. 
B. BENEFIT SHARING AND THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL: 
ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO RESPECT INDIGENOUS 
TRADITIONAL RIGHTS 
1. Actions Required by New Zealand Should it Choose to 
Ratify the Nagoya Protocol 
The Nagoya Protocol establishes an Access and Benefit-
Sharing Clearing House (ABSCH), which has manifested in the 
form of a database available entirely online.117 The ABSCH 
profiles each state, even those not a party to the Protocol or even 
the Convention on Biodiversity itself, and tracks each of the 
obligations of the parties under the Protocol.118 Articles 13, 14, 
17, and 29 of the Protocol provide the basis for individual state 
 
 113. Woods, supra note 59, at 101. 
 114. Corbett, supra note 25, at 5. 
 115. See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1–4. 
 116. Corbett, supra note 25, at 5. 
 117. See Country Profiles, ABSCH: ACCESS & BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-
HOUSE, https://absch.cbd.int/countries (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
 118. Id. 
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responsibilities.119 
Article 13 of the Protocol requires a state to designate a 
national focal point, or contact person, typically a government 
agency official.120 Curiously, many states including New Zealand 
who are not parties to the Nagoya Protocol have a contact listed 
on the ABSCH website.121 Under Article 13, states are also 
required to name competent national authorities, responsible for 
regulating the concrete legal measures required by Article 14.122 
Multiple state parties to the Protocol provide a variety of pre-
existing environmental government agencies or ministries as 
their competent national authorities; others have developed new 
agencies specifically named as centers on access and benefit-
sharing.123 In order to comply with this requirement, New 
Zealand would need to construct relatively little.124 The 
Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, though primarily 
Western-oriented as a trademark and patent regime, accounts 
for mātauranga Māori.125 The Department of Conservation, 
mentioned throughout the Wai 262 Report and included in the 
recommendations, also falls within competent national 
authorities parameters.126 The Waitangi Tribunal itself could 
 
 119. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 13–14, 17, 29. 
 120. Id. art. 13. 
 121. See ABSCH: ACCESS & BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, supra 
note 117. 
 122. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, art. 13. 
 123. See, e.g., Belarus: Competent National Authorities, ABSCH: ACCESS & 
BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, https://absch.cbd.int/countries/BY (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2018); Mexico: Competent National Authorities, ABSCH: ACCESS 
& BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, https://absch.cbd.int/countries/MX 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018); Peru: Competent National Authorities, ABSCH: 
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Authorities, ABSCH: ACCESS & BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE, 
https://absch.cbd.int/countries/SY (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
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likely to contribute to New Zealand’s refusal to adopt the Protocol. See Corbett, 
supra note 25, at 9. 
 125. An entire section of the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand is 
devoted to “Māori IP.” Recognition itself is the first step; however, the 
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Corbett, supra note 25, at 5 (explaining that Western intellectual property laws 
do not acknowledge collective ownerships); Māori IP, N.Z. INTELL. PROP. OFF., 
https://www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/maori-ip/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
 126. See WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, 2 KO AOTEAROA TENEI: A REPORT INTO 
CLAIMS CONCERNING NEW ZEALAND LAW AND POLITY AFFECTING MĀORI 
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also qualify as a competent national authority.127 Together, the 
national focal point and competent national authorities ideally 
provide information, grant access and oversee compliance with 
respect to users and providers within the state.128 
Article 14 stipulates that states must make a  variety of 
information available to the ABSCH, including concrete 
legislative, administrative, and policy policy access rights and 
benefit-sharing.129 New Zealand patent law currently compels 
the existence of the Patents Māori Advisory Committee 
(“Patents MAC”), though the current Patents MAC does not 
conform entirely to the Wai 262 Report recommendation.130 The 
Patents MAC advises whether an invention claimed on a patent 
application was derived from Māori traditional knowledge as 
well as whether the commercial exploitation of it would be 
“contrary to Māori values.”131 
The Wai 262 Report also recommends a register of guardian 
interests in taonga species, a legal requirement that patent 
applications include disclosure of Māori traditional knowledge 
used in research.132 If implemented, the register would qualify 
 
CULTURE AND IDENTITY 491 (2011), https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/
Documents/WT/wt_DOC_68356606/KoAotearoaTeneiTT2Vol2W.pdf 
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biodiversity management). 
 127. This is especially so given that the Wai 262 Report has provided a 
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2014), http://www.cisdl.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Global-Overview-of-
ABS-Measures_FINAL_SBSTTA18.pdf. 
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CONVENTION ON BIODIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/abs/keysteps.shtml (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
 130. N.Z. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY WITH A MÃORI CULTURAL ELEMENT: USER GUIDE 5–6 (2016), 
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 131. Id. at 5. When the Intellectual Property Office receives an application 
for a patent, the office first decides whether the application needs to be 
considered by the Patents MAC. See also Patents Act of 2013, ss 225–28 (N.Z.). 
 132. Cf. Patents Act of 2013, 226 (N.Z.); see also WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 
2, at 202–03. 
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as a concrete measure under Article 14.133 Additionally, the 
Tribunal recommended that Māori be allowed input in decisions 
made by the Department of Conservation regarding 
bioprospecting; policy along these lines would fall within Article 
14, should it be developed.134 Under Article 14, the state must 
also produce copies of permits issued when a biological resource 
is accessed, that are then archived in the ABSCH and used as 
evidence of compliance.135 
2. Unpacking New Zealand’s Reluctance to Ratify the 
Nagoya Protocol 
In 2015, New Zealand submitted a National Report to the 
CBD serving as a mid-term assessment of its implementation.136 
The review process involved addressing a set of twenty targets 
under Strategic Goal A, which aim to address the underlying 
causes of biodiversity loss, one of which is to be a party to and 
compliant with the Nagoya Protocol.137 This report 
acknowledges that New Zealand has not yet signed the Protocol 
even though it is of particular interest given that New Zealand 
is both a “user and provider of genetic resources.”138 The Crown 
also highlights the lack of existing domestic access and benefit-
sharing framework, but maintains that certain legislation 
provides coverage.139 The National Report then cites the Treaty 
of Waitangi as justification for refusing to sign, stating that “it 
is essential . . . that any domestic or international regime 
maintains the Crown’s ability to fulfill its obligations under the 
Treaty of Waitangi.”140 
By ratifying the Nagoya Protocol, New Zealand would be 
required to come to terms with the requirement that indigenous 
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 134. WAI 262 REPORT, supra note 2, at 198. 
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requests be formally upheld by law.141 The Crown has taken the 
position that it prefers to first settle the Wai 262 claim.142 With 
the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand 
domestic affairs, the Crown has stressed the importance of 
keeping options—in terms of domestic policy on access to 
biological resources—free from limitation.143 The potential high 
cost of compliance that would include bringing into force 
appropriate legislation, policies, and processes for monitoring 
compliance coupled with uncertainty of how best to address 
these complex requirements are likely contributing factors.144 
C. ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WAI 262 REPORT 
1. Wai 262: What has Been Accomplished so Far? 
In the Wai 262 Report, the Tribunal ultimately found failure 
on the part of the New Zealand government to fulfill its 
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi to acknowledge and 
safeguard the guardian relationships between Māori and their 
taonga.145 The Tribunal also stresses the importance of 
partnership and shared responsibility in protecting and 
conveying mātauranga Māori.146 The government of New 
Zealand has yet to issue a formal response to the Report or even 
a timeframe for responding, but has implemented certain 
measures in response.147 The Report made several 
recommendations with respect to the protection of traditional 
knowledge.148 Several will be examined below in light of New 
Zealand’s actions (or lack thereof) since the release of the Report 
in 2011. 
In terms of patents, the Tribunal recommended that an 
advisory committee be formed to give input to the Commissioner 
of Patents, the official who considers and grants patent rights, 
on Māori interests.149 The Tribunal envisioned a committee that 
would advise on issues concerning mātauranga Māori, 
 
 141. Corbett, supra note 25, at 9. 
 142. Scheeles, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
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 144. Corbett, supra note 25, at 9. 
 145. See Sullivan & Tuffery-Huria, supra note 16, at 403. 
 146. Id. at 407. 
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specifically when kaitiakitanga (guardianship interests) are 
involved.150 Per the recommendation, the committee would be 
given (1) considerable authority to give formal advice that the 
Commissioner would be obligated to consider, as well as (2) the 
ability to investigate any patent or patent application as it sees 
fit.151 The kaitiaki (guardians) would also have the option to 
register their interests in a particular species in order to give a 
patent owner fair warning of the interest, though it would not 
need to be registered in order to be considered by the committee. 
Additionally, patent applicants within New Zealand would be 
required to disclose whether they relied on Māori traditional 
knowledge.152 
The Tribunal devotes a section of the Report to plant variety 
rights, ultimately finding that “while Māori have no proprietary 
rights in taonga species, the cultural relationship between 
kaitiaki and taonga species is entitled to reasonable 
protection.”153 This reasonable protection does not include the 
exclusive right of the kaitiaki to breed, sell, and export taonga 
species.154 The Report provides two recommendations.155 First, 
any new plant variety rights legislation should include a Māori 
power of refusal if the plant variety rights would affect kaitiaki 
relationships with taonga species.156 Second, the Patents MAC, 
the advisory committee to the Commissioner of Patents, should 
also assist in crafting adequate ethical guidelines and codes of 
conduct for use by those in research and development, and in the 
education sector as a whole.157 
New Zealand’s Patents Act 2013 provides for a Māori 
advisory committee, the Patents MAC, which has considerably 
more limited functions than recommended by the Wai 262 
Report.158 While it is possible to assume that this new Patents 
Act resulted from the Wai 262 Report, it was actually proposed 
prior to the issuance of the Report and then delayed in order to 
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give the government an opportunity to consider the 
recommendations made by the Tribunal in the Report.159 
Developments regarding the protection of mātauranga Māori 
continue to be driven predominantly by Māori, and tend to be 
localized to a specific purpose or issue.160 While the New Zealand 
government may provide funding or support in certain 
instances, it has yet to provide any formal directives of its 
own.161 
The Wai 262 consolidated claim itself does not focus on 
whether existing intellectual property laws are sufficient to 
accommodate mātauranga Māori.162 The claim instead appears 
to be driven by a desire to show that imposing a Western 
intellectual property regime upon Māori is contrary to Māori 
interests.163 According to some scholars, there is little 
engagement with the issues that typically inform the debate 
over whether legal protection of traditional knowledge—
including ideas of group ownership—can be accommodated by 
intellectual property regimes such as patents and plant variety 
rights.164 Instead, the Wai 262 claim is more of a demand to 
repeal and reassess New Zealand intellectual property laws that 
are inconsistent with Māori rights under the Treaty of 
Waitangi.165 The Wai 262 Rport then addresses the claims and 
issues recommendations accordingly.166 
2. The Ordre Public: A Potential Issue 
A recommendation for an extensive ordre public is included 
in the Wai 262 Report, permitting outright denial of patents for 
inventions in which the prevention of commercial exploitation of 
the subject matter is necessary to protect public order or 
morality, including human, animal or plant life, or to avoid 
serious destruction to the environment.167 The immediate 
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problem is the fact that New Zealand has no commanding 
judicial or legislative guidance related to the actual meaning or 
enforcement of an ordre public.168 The Wai 262 recommendation 
prioritizes guardianship relationships with mātauranga Māori, 
giving the Commissioner the authority to deny otherwise eligible 
patents.169 While it does leave the criteria for patent applications 
intact, some scholars think that it allows all parties to avoid 
confronting the more difficult issues, such as informed consent 
and disclosure, by acting as a catch-all. 
It is possible that the ordre public could function 
retroactively, causing the nullification of an existing patent 
which may not be proportional to the fault of the patent-
holder.170 Such an issue would arise in cases where Māori guides 
researchers to particular mātauranga, which is further 
developed with substantial additional research into a product, 
for which Māori are given no credit.171 Further complicating the 
matter is the fact that the specific mātauranga may belong to 
one specific Māori tribe.172 The ordre public provides for a 
strictly black and white dichotomy: grant or refuse the patent 
outright.173 A better option might be for the Commissioner to 
allow conditions for the patent applicant to correct the situation 
in order that the invention may then be patentable.174 
D. RECONCILING NEW ZEALAND’S CURRENT INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SYSTEM, THE WAI 262 AND THE NAGOYA 
PROTOCOL: A MĀORI-CENTERED SOLUTION 
1. Wai 262 Recommendations as a Framework for New 
Zealand’s Access and Benefit-Sharing Regime 
In the Wai 262 Report, the Tribunal recommends the 
establishment of the Māori advisory committee, which is not 
particularly necessary under the Nagoya Protocol. Although the 
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Patents MAC exists, there is currently no information or data 
available to confirm that it functions in harmony with the Wai 
262 Report recommendation calling for its existence. However, 
the Tribunal seems to endorse the MAC as advisory (as opposed 
to directive) in nature, meaning that like the Tribunal, its advice 
would not be binding.175 The Tribunal also stresses the need to 
balance all competing interests on a case-by-case basis with 
respect to advising the Commissioner of Patents.176 Not to 
mention, the MAC appears to provide more of an administrative 
(as opposed to substantive) augmentation to the current 
intellectual property regime.177 
The Tribunal also recommends the institution of a voluntary 
register of kaitiaki (guardianship) interests in mātauranga 
Māori and taonga species.178 Registration would be publicly 
available as well as allow potential users to easily familiarize 
themselves with existing Māori interests.179 Though the 
Tribunal provides that registration should not be obligatory, 
such a register would also function as an administrative 
supplement to New Zealand intellectual property law.180 In 
theory, this system would likely cause more issues than it solves. 
Some Māori may be reluctant to make their sacred relationships 
available to the public, given potential to facilitate biopiracy.181 
However, the Tribunal points out in the Report that a register 
would be able to address the needs of guardians whose 
mātauranga is already available in the public domain.182 
Additionally, it would not limit or require significant change to 
current New Zealand intellectual property law, and its optional 
nature would protect Māori who prefer to keep their 
guardianship out of the public sphere.183 
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2. The Nagoya Protocol Fills the Gaps within the Waitangi 
Tribunal Framework 
The Wai 262 Report recommends several negative 
protections allowing Māori to prevent exploitation of 
mātauranga by third parties, but fails to provide for any positive 
protections, such as rights that would allow guardians to develop 
and protect mātauranga for their own benefit.184 This is in part 
due to the concept of ownership and exclusive rights being 
incompatible with Māori guardianship philosophy.185 
However, the Nagoya Protocol does provide for these 
positive rights by allowing for partnerships to be formed 
between Māori and those seeking to use mātauranga Māori. Any 
legislative or policy initiatives developed by the New Zealand 
government to conform with Article 14 of the Nagoya Protocol 
would likely provide some form of positive rights to Māori. The 
combination of positive and negative rights thus empowers 
Māori by both protecting and promoting mātauranga. 
3. The Answer to Difficult Questions Involving Indigenous 
Issues is More Indigenous Involvement 
Professor Linda Tuhiwai Smith, a leading Māori researcher 
and academic, illustrates: 
The past, [indigenous] stories local and global, the 
present . . . communities, cultures, languages and social 
practices—all may be spaces of marginalization, but they 
have also become spaces of resistance and hope. It is from 
within these spaces that increasing numbers of 
indigenous academics and researchers have begun to 
address social issues within the wider framework of self-
determination, decolonization and social justice.186 
The few indigenous researchers who have succeeded in 
academia typically have had to achieve more than their peers in 
order to establish themselves.187 Not only must they survive and 
do exceedingly well, but they must do so in a system that denies 
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306 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1 
the existence of traditional knowledge of their own peoples.188 It 
is a fine line to walk in terms of earning credentials, “decod[ing] 
and demystify[ing] the system in order to learn and be educated 
without being damaged.”189 Once inside, indigenous researchers 
are also tasked with making the case for the existence of 
indigenous traditional knowledge as its own distinctive body of 
worldly knowledge capable of contributing to modern disciplines 
in addition to indigenous communities themselves.190 Even 
finding journals to publish indigenous research in general, as it 
relates to traditional knowledge or otherwise, also proves to be 
challenge.191 
Indigenous scholars and activists have fought to protect 
their own systems of study and research of traditional 
knowledge.192 In terms of Māori, indigenous knowledge 
scholarship appears to thrive both within Māori institutions and 
within a wide range of disciplines including science, health, and 
Māori studies themselves.193 Conceptual work relating to the 
mātauranga Māori continue to be institutionalized in student 
dissertations, research programs, and Masters-level courses of 
study within universities.194 As is evident in the quote at the 
beginning of this section, the lengths that indigenous 
communities have successfully gone to protect and nurture 
traditional knowledge as a whole in the face of colonization is 
inspiring.195 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If applied together, the Waitangi Tribunal and Nagoya 
Protocol have the capacity to provide recognition and protection 
to Māori that do not currently exist under any state intellectual 
property regime. Instead of forcing established indigenous 
cultural ideals to abide by incompatible Western intellectual 
property mechanisms, both the Waitangi Tribunal and Nagoya 
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Protocol provide sensitivity to this issue as well as alternative 
ways to protect and respect mātauranga Māori. This model could 
then provide an example to other states with indigenous peoples 
within their borders as a way to foster and promote rights for all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
